Impleader in Montana after Duschesneau v. Silver Bow County by Strong, R. Keith
Montana Law Review
Volume 34
Issue 2 Summer 1973 Article 7
7-1-1973
Impleader in Montana after Duschesneau v. Silver
Bow County
R. Keith Strong
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.umt.edu/mlr
Part of the Law Commons
This Note is brought to you for free and open access by The Scholarly Forum @ Montana Law. It has been accepted for inclusion in Montana Law
Review by an authorized editor of The Scholarly Forum @ Montana Law.
Recommended Citation
R. Keith Strong, Impleader in Montana after Duschesneau v. Silver Bow County, 34 Mont. L. Rev. (1973).
Available at: https://scholarship.law.umt.edu/mlr/vol34/iss2/7
NOTES
IMPLEADER IN MONTANA AFTER DUCHESNEAU v.
SILVER BOW COUNTY
R. Keith Strong
The 1961 adoption of Rule 14 of the Montana Rules of Civil
Procedure1 created a new procedural right. A defendant 2 may now
implead-he may bring into the suit other persons who were not origin-
ally parties but who are or may be liable to the defendant for all or
part of the plaintiff's claim.3 The Montana supreme court has seldom
interpreted the rule since its adoption. 4 In 1971, Duchesneau v. Silver
Bow County5 demanded an interpretation of impleader. The court's
response is the subject of this note.
THE GREAT NORTH MONTANA
STREET WATER TRUCK DISASTER
It was mid-afternoon, August 26, 1968, and Neil Bolton, an employee
of Silver Bow County had already flushed Butte's North Montana
Street with several loads of water. He finished loading the county's
water truck for another run, climbed in, disengaged the clutch and
turned the wheels of the truck downhill into the flow of traffic. When
the truck started to roll Bolton tried to put it into second gear. It would
not go. He tried the brakes. The pedal went to the floor. A worn hose
in an air-operated power steering unit had bled the air from the brakes.
Meanwhile the truck was rolling down North Montana Street, gathering
speed with each foot it traveled. Nine blocks and sixteen damaged
automobiles later, after injuring three people and mangling the rear
fender of a motorbike being pushed out of harm's way by Officer Tallon
of the Butte Police Department, the truck stopped in the showroom
of the Wilson Motor Company. The building collapsed.6
'MONTANA RuLEs OF CIVIL PROCEDURE, (Hereinafter citer M.R.Civ. P.) Rule 14. Third-
party practice. (a) When defendant may bring in third party. "At any time after
commencement of the action a defendant as a third-party plaintiff may cause to be
served a summons and complaint upon a person not a party to the action who is or
may be liable to him for all or part of the plaintiff's claim against him. ..
9M. R. Civ. P., Rule 14 (b) allows a plaintiff who has been served a counterclaim
to implead in the same manner as a defendant.
'For general discussion of impleader see: J. MOORE, 3 MOORE'S FEDERAL PRACTICE,
Chapter 14 [hereafter cited Moore]; C. WRIGHT AND A. MILLER, 6 FEDERAL PRACTICE
AND PROCEDURE, § 1441 et seq. (1971) [hereafter cited Wright and Miller].
'Wheat v. Safeway Stores, Inc., 146 Mont. 105, 404 P.2d 317 (1965) and Crosby v.
Billings Deaconess Hospital "v. Fuller and Gain, 149 Mont. 314, 426 P.2d 217 (1967)
discuss the application of M. R. Civ. P., Rule 14 to Montana law.
5Duchesneau v. Silver Bow County, 158 Mont. 369, 492 P.2d 926 (1971).
6For a more detailed if somewhat apocalyptic account of these events see the MONTANA
STANDARD, August 27, 1968, pp. 1 and 2 and pictures scattered throughout the issue.
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Joseph L. Wilson, the owner of Wilson Motor Company and his
insurer, Hardware Mutual Insurance Company sued the county and
Bolton using the theory of negligence. Wilson and Hardware Mutual
joined as defendants Roberts Rocky Mountain Equipment claiming
that Roberts had negligently installed the power steering unit, and
Mack Trucks claiming that Mack had sold the defective power steering
unit to Roberts. All the rest of the plaintiffs, the injured parties and
the owners of the damaged cars, chose not to sue Roberts and Mack.
They joined only the county as defendant.
The county found itself sole defendant in several suits. To try to
avoid being solely liable to these plaintiffs the county impleaded Roberts
and Mack wherever they were not already defendants. The county's
third party complaint, served according to Rule 14, reads :7
II. That the negligence, damage and liability alleged by Ray
Reid in his complaint is [sic] not the liability of Silver Bow County
and the accident made the basis of said complaint was beyond the
control of the said Silver Bow County and the Third Party Defend-
ants are liable for said accident and any proximate damage or
injury therefrom ...
WHEREFORE, Defendant, Silver Bow County prays that the plain-
tiff take nothing by virtue of his complaint and the said Third
Party Plaintiff further demand judgment against the Third Party
Defendants for all sums that may be adjudged against the said
Silver Bow County in favor of the plaintiff, Ray Reid.
The third-party complaint seems to make two claims. First the complaint
says that the county is not liable but Roberts and Mack are. Second
the complaint claims the right to recover from Roberts and Mack any
sums for which the county is found liable.
The trial court disagreed with both claims." Roberts and Mack
were granted summary judgment in all suits, both as defendants and
as third-party defendants. Summary judgment went against the county
in all suits on the issue of liability. The county appealed all the
summary judgments. To appreciate the Montana supreme court's dis-
position of the appeal it is necessary to examine the background of Rule
14, Montana's impleader provision.
THE ORIGIN OF IMPLEADER IN MONTANA
IMPLEADER AND THE FEDERAL RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE
Impleader was one of the innovations 9 of the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure when they were adopted in 193810 for use in the federal dis-
7Duchesneau, eapra note 5 at 934, quoted by Castles, 3., in his dissent to the refusal to
grant rehearing.
8 d. at 928.
'MooRE, supra note 3 at 441-478 gives a comprehensive survey of existing law at the
time of the adoption of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure providing rights similar
to impleader. See also WRIGHT, supra note 3 at 199-200.
1°Order, 308 U. S. 645.
1973]
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trict courts. Impleader traces its immediate parentage to maritime law."
It was designed to accomplish three general goals :12
1. To avoid circuity of actions by settling all disputes arising from
one occurrence in one suit;
2. To spare an unsuccessful defendant the burden of bearing ajudgment against him while he brought suit against someone
liable to him for the plaintiff's claim; and
3. To prevent inconsistent judgments on the same facts.
The aim was to settle the ultimate liability for a claim with a minimum
of effort and expense.'3
The Rule 14 adopted in the federal courts in 1938 attempted to
reach these ends by allowing the defendant in an action to implead
anyone who was or might be "liable to him or to the plaintiff for all or
part of the plaintiff's claim against him.' 4 (emphasis added) Thus
under the terms of the original Rule 14 a defendant could bring into
the suit someone whom the plaintiff had not joined as a defendant
but who might nevertheless be liable to the plaintiff directly. But the
early cases generally, 15 although not universally,' held that when a
defendant impleaded someone who was directly liable to the plaintiff,
the plaintiff could not be forced to amend his complaint and proceed
against the impleaded party as well as the original defendant.'7 Under
this interpretation, impleading someone directly liable to the plaintiff
whom the plaintiff had already decided not to sue did nothing more
than add a superfluous party to the action. The words "or to the
plaintiff" were dropped from the federal Rule 14 by order of the United
States Supreme Court in 1946.18
After the 1946 change, a defendant no longer could implead a
person unless that person either was or might be liable to the defendant.
It was no longer enough that the person impleaded was liable either
to the plaintiff or to the defendant. The only liability that mattered
for purposes of impleader was liability of the person impleaded to the
defendant. A defendant might, however, implead someone whose liabil-
"See supra note 15 and the discussion in Atlantic Coast Line R. v. United States Fidelity
& Guaranty Co., 52 F. Supp. 177 (D.C.M.D. Ga. 1943).
12MOORE, supra note 3 at 501, WRIGHT supra note 3, § 1442. See also, Developments In
the Law-Multiparty Litigation in the Federal Courts, 71 HARV. L. REv. 874, 906-12
(1958).
31id.
1Order, 308 U.S. 645, 681-2 (1939).
15Satink v. Holland Tp., 31 F. Supp. 229 (D.C. N.J. 1940); Delano v. Ives 40 F. Supp.
672 (E.D. Pa. 1941).
'InAtlantic Coast Line B. Co. v. United States Fidelity &- Guranty Co., supra note 11,
the court argued from analogy to Admiralty Rule 56, then 28 U.S.C.A. § 723, which
it found to be the predecessor of Rule 14 that the defendant can force the original
plaintiff to amend his complain and proceed against the impleaded party. Landis
and Landis, Federal Impleader, 34 CORNELL LAW Q. 404-5 (1949).
17Ives, supra note 15 at 673 and cases cited.
'
8Order, 239 U.S. 843, 852 (1946).
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ity to him was contingent-dependent upon a prior recovery by the
plaintiff against the defendant.' 9 Warranty,20 contribution 2' and in-
demnity 22 are all typical examples of the contingent liability forming
the basis for impleader in jurisdictions recognizing these rights.
IMPLEADER AND THE MONTANA RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE
In 1959, the Legislative Assembly of the State of Montana author-
ized the creation of a commission "to make possible the adoption of
the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure so far as seems presently practic-
able to the existing Montana Code."'2' The commission's report took
effect as the Montana Rules of Civil Procedure in 1962.24 The Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure as they stood at that time, including Rule 14,
were adopted almost verbatim.2
5
Montana adopted the federal Rule 14 impleader sixteen years after
the 1946 amendment. For 16 years it had been settled law in the
federal system that a defendant could not implead a person who was
liable to the plaintiff but not to the defendant. The person impleaded
must be liable to the defendant for the plaintiff's claim, either immedi-
ately or contingently through some theory such as warranty,26 con-
tribution2 7 or indemnity.28 The basic scheme of Montana's Rule 14 has
not been changed since the rule was adopted.
DUCHESNEAU AND IMPLEADER
THE DUCHESNEAU HOLDING
This, then, is the background upon which the Montana supreme
court could draw when the county appealed the lower court's order
denying impleader. The supreme court reversed. 29 Holding that Roberts
and Mack had properly been impleaded the court said:
Next, Roberts and Mack Truck argue that the third party com-
plaints of Silver Bow County do not state a claim against them,
because there is no right to contribution in Montana and there is no
right of indemnity until after payment. This argument misconstrues
the gist of the third party claim against Roberts and Mack Trucks.
'
9
MOORE, supra note 3 at 531-534, 551-557, 571-577; WRIGHT AND MILLER, supra note 3
at § 1446.
21Altac Inc. v. FWD Corp., 399 F.2d 860 (C.A. 5th 1968).
t Smith v. Whitmore, 270 F.2d 741, (3d Cir. 1959).
2Crosby v. Billings Deaconess Hospital v. Fuller and Cain, sapra note 4.
2Laws of Montana, 1959, Ch. 255.
24Laws of Montana, 1963, Ch. 16.
2The Advisory Commission's note to M. R. Civ. P., Rule 14 says that the only change
from the federal rule was the addition of amendments making impleader a matter
of right within a certain time period.
2Altac Inc. v. FWD Corp., supra note 20.
'Smith v. Whitmore, supra note 21.
'Crosby v. Billings Deaconess Hospital v. Fuller and Cain, sapra note 4.
'Duchesneau v. Silver Bow County, supra note 5 at 931.
1Id. at 931.
19-73]
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Silver Bow County contends it was not negligent and no act or
omission with which it is chargeable proximately caused the accident
and that liability rests solely on Roberts and Mack Trucks. Here
also, our previous holding that there are material issues of fact as
yet unresolved concerning the liability of Silver Bow County and
Bolton, renders the application of joint tortfeasor and indemnity
principles premature. Accordingly this contention fails.'
The court appears to have reached two conclusions. First the court
says that the county had properly impleaded Roberts and Mack by
claiming that Roberts and Mack were directly liable to the plaintiffs.
The court alloved the county to implead people who were only liable
to the plaintiff. Second, the court said that neither contribution nor
indemnity was relevant to a discussion of impleader because no final
judgment had been reached ol liability. A defendant apparently must
wait until after judgment and then implead. The holdings are counter
to both the spirit and the letter of Rule 14.
DUCHESN EAU ANfD SUBSTITUTION OF DEFENDANTS BY IMPLEADER
The Duchesneau court, citing no authority, allowed the county to
implead Roberts and Mack because they might be directly liable to the
plaintiffs.8 1 Through impleader Roberts and Mack occupy the same
relation to the plaintiff as the original defendants, even though the
plaintiffs did not choose to sue them. As has been pointed out above, the
federal Rule 14 was amended twenty-five years before Duchesneau was
decided with the express purpose of avoiding this result.3 2 Montana's
Rule 14 is the federal rule as it stood after the 1946 amendment.33 Mon-
tana's Rule 14 states that only persons who are or may be liable to
the defendant may be impleaded.3 4 This much of the Duchesneau holding
cannot be supported by the words of Rule 14.
Impleader of persons directly liable to the plaintiff can only defeat
the goals impleader was designed to achieve. The court did not discuss
whether the plaintiff must amend his complaint and proceed against
the impleaded parties as defendants. If the plaintiff is not forced to
amend his complaint he is likely to abide by his decision to sue only
the original defendant. Impleader has only forced the impleaded party
to go to the expense of answering the third-party complaint the defend-
ant served upon him. Even if the plaintiff is forced to amend, the final
result would be the same. The original defendant is still a party to
the suit. The plaintiff can pursue his remedy against the defendant to
a judgment. The defendant can use the same defenses regardless of
whether the impleaded person is a party to the suit. Once again the
only gain is in additional expense and effort for the impleaded party.
n!d.
9See discussion supra.33Compare the Montana impleader provision quoted in relevant part supra, note 1,
with the federal rule as amended discussed in the text supra.
1M. R. Civ. P., Rule 14, supra note 1.
[Vol. 34
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Holding that the defendant may implead persons not liable to him, but
directly liable to the plaintiff, only adds superfluous parties to the
lawsuit.
DUCHESNEAU AND INDEMNITY AS A BASIS FOR IMPLEADER
The Duchesneau holding would have been justified if it had been
based upon a recognition that impleader is proper when the defendant
is seeking indemnity from the third party defendant. As seen above,
Rule 14 allows a defendant to implead someone who is or may be liable
to the defendant for the plaintiff's claim.8 5 Persons whose liability to
the defendant is eontingent upon the defendant's being held liable to
the plaintiff may properly be impleaded.3 6 Indemnity is a good example
of such a contingent liability. 7 The Duchesneau court expressly dis-
approved indemnity as a basis for impleader, at least until a judgment
on the issue of liability had been rendered on retrial.88 The court cited
no authority for this ruling. It should have been bound by an earlier
Montana case holding to the contrary.
In Crosby v. Billings Deaconess Hospital v. Fuller and Cain,89 the
defendant hospital acting under Rule 14 joined as third party defendant
the person who had leased to it television equipment which injured the
plaintiff. The defendant's third-party complaint asked that the lessor
indemnify the hospital for any damages collected by the plaintiff against
the hospital. The Montana court held the third-party complaint not
subject to a dismissal on a motion for summary judgment if the com-
plaint stated a valid claim for indemnity.40 In Duchesneau, the county's
claim for relief asked that Roberts and Mack be held liable for any
damages which might be adjudged against the county.41 This is a simple
plea for indemnity.42 The Crosby43 ease was not specifically overruled
in Duchesneau, nor was it mentioned. It should have been controlling.
To hold otherwise is to encourage rather than reduce circuity of actions
by forcing all claims for indemnity to wait until after the defendant
has been held liable to the plaintiff. Then the defendant must bring
his claim for indemnity in a new action. The defendant must bear the
judgment in the meantime and face the risk of inconsistent judgments
85M. R. Civ. P., Rule 14, supra note 1.
O'See supra note 19.
'7Crosby v. Billings Deaconess Hospital v. Fuller and Cain, supra note 4.
fDuchesneau v. Silver Bow County, supra note 5 at 931.
"Crosby v. Billings Deaconess Hospital v. Fuller and Cain, 149 Mont. 369, 426 P.2d
217 (1967). The Crosby court at 219 deals with Rule 14 although it erroneously
refers to the Rule 14 procedure as a cross-claim rather than a third-party complaint.0Id, at 200.
dDuchesneau v. Silver Bow County, supra note 5 at 931.
"Note, Contribution and Indennity Among Joint Tortfeasors, 31 MONTANA L. Rzv.
69 (1970) and authorities cited. See also, the discussion of indemnity in Crosby, aUPtra
note 39 at 219-220.
"Crosby v. Billings Deaconess Hospital v. Puller and Cain, supra note 39.
1973]
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on the same facts. All of the goals of impleader are defeated by such a
holding.44
IMPLEADER AND THE DUCHESNEAU DISSENT
Justice Castles' dissent to Duchesneau45 would seem to be erroneous
for different reasons. Two points are the essence of the dissent. First
it is argued that the county's third-party complaint is a demand for
contribution from Mack and Roberts. Justice Castles concludes that
since there is no right to contribution in Montana, the third-party
complaint was properly dismissed below. 46
A demand for contribution would be a demand by the county for
payment of the proportionate share of the judgment against the county
for which Mack and Roberts would be liable as joint tortfeasors. 47 The
county's complaint asked for judgment against Mack and Roberts for
all sums for which the county might be held liable.4 The county asked
for indemnity, not contribution.49 No discussion of contribution was
necessary in the case.
The second point of the dissent is that allowing impleader "thwarted"
the plaintiff's claim. 50 It has already been seen that even if the plain-
tiff is forced to proceed against the impleaded party he still has his
action against the original party as well.51 The plaintiff's claim was
"thwarted" by the majority's decision to reverse the lower court's judg-
ment in favor of the plaintiff on the grounds of liability. Impleader
had no effect.
CONCLUSION
Impleader under Rule 14 is an effective tool for saving a defend-
ant effort and expense. Impleader allows him to join, on such theories
as indemnity, contribution or warranty, those who might be liable to
him for the plaintiff's claim but who were not originally parties to the
suit. Used correctly, impleader can help reduce the number of suits
necessary to settle the ultimate liability. Impleader can save the defend-
ant the burden of a judgment against him while he seeks recompense
from someone liable to him for the plaintiff's claim. Impleader can
help the defendant avoid the possibility of inconsistent verdicts on
the same facts. Impleader is no longer intended as a method of allow-
"See discussion supra and material supra note 12.
'
5Duchesneau v. Silver Bow County, supra note 5 at 933.
"Id.
'
7Note, Contribution and Indemnity Among Joint Tortfeasors, 31 MONTANA L. REv.
69 (1970) and authorities cited for a distinction between contribution and indemnity.
tSDuchesneau v. Silver Bow County, supra note 5 at 934.
98See supra note 47.
5'Duchesneau v. Silver Bow County, supra note 5 at 935.
51See discussion supra of the effect of the Duchesneau ruling on the plaintiff's remedies.
[Vol. 34
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ing a defendant to force upon a plaintiff a new set of defendants whom
the plaintiff has chosen not to sue. Duchesneau v. Silver Bow County
seems to deny the benefits of impleader in cases in which the defendant
seeks indemnity. Duchesneau seems to allow a defendant to bring into
the suit defendants whom the plaintiff has chusen not to sue. Both
results should be disapproved.
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